This article explores the critical question of how music videos portrayed the "new bourgeoisie" in early post-socialist music videos. Additionally, it tackles two side issues: the depiction of criminal groups and foreign countries. Unlike the "new class", post-socialist new bourgeoisie emerged as a class that was entirely economically defi ned by its own material interests. Several values attributable to post-socialist "new bourgeoisie" can be discerned from the music videos: an interplay of ambitions and hedonism, cosmopolitanism as well as of patriotic narratives, and the aspiration of the new bourgeoisie to assert its culturedness vis-à-vis the "intelligentsia".
ers" (vekslácký pop) (Havlík 2012: 68-75) . To understand this description, we need only revisit "Give and Take", which openly depicts the underworld of the Czechoslovak grey economy. The video includes shots that were lifted directly from the 1988 fi lm "A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed" (Kamarád do deště, directed by Jaroslav Soukup), whose plot unfolds inside the world of illegal money changers (veksláci) on the streets of Prague. While the goal of the fi lm, like that of many others of the glasnost era, was likely to shock audiences and denounce criminal activities, the video clip shows money changers in a far less serious light. These scenes suggest a hedonistic individualism surrounding the clubs and fancy hotel bars of downtown Prague. In this way, the song's title may also refl ect the new economic paradigm of the Soviet bloc, which by the late 1980s had started to integrate the patterns of capitalist economies (Bockman 2011) .
Inspired by "Give and Take" as well as several other similar music videos, this article explores the critical question of how music videos portrayed the "new bourgeoisie" in the early post-socialist period. In particular, I consider the values attributed to this class and situate them in the broader context of post-socialist change. My primary sources are six music videos that were shot between 1988 and 1997; their countries of origin were Czechoslovakia (and Czech Republic), Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union (and Russia), and they were accessed between August 2016 and April 2018 as part of a YouTube content analysis. 2 My search for music videos followed a series of unstructured (and in some cases long-running) interviews with individuals who grew up in one of the four given countries during the 1990s. 3 Additionally, this article tackles a number of side issues raised by both the music videos and the interviews: these concern the depiction of criminal groups and foreign countries. The economic and social changes that followed political changes in these former Soviet bloc countries in the early post-socialist period (i.e. the 2 Two of these music videos were Czech, two were Russian, one was Polish and one was Romanian. The complete list is as follows (all translations are mine):
1. " Give and Take" (Dávej ber), 1988, Czechoslovakia, performed 3 As such, this research is also a study of historical memory, and it should be stressed that when it came to the 1990s, my informants, all of whom had undertaken further education in the social sciences (linguistics and urban studies) or the humanities (contemporary history and social anthropology), were anything but nostalgic. Given the substantial historical as well as contextual diff erences between popular culture artefacts produced in former Soviet bloc countries and those emerging from the former Yugoslavia, I have chosen to omit the analysis of music videos from the former Yugoslavia which appeared in previous versions of this study. In doing so, my aim is to limit the already broad comparative scope of this work. Instead, I focus in depth on the four given countries in the decade after the major political, economic and social changes of 1989/1990. 1990s) produced a new affl uent class that I have called the new bourgeoisie. The marked impact of this class on architecture (Holleran 2014 , Ruegg 2015 and the suburban space (Văetişi 2011; Blinnikov et al. 2006 ) has been noted, 4 and its contribution to non-material culture including music videos should also be illuminated.
REFLECTIONS ON THE POST-SOCIALIST NEW BOURGEOISIE
This article is an attempt to apply a model of social relations based on a specifi c class segment called the new bourgeoisie (see, for example, Becker 1983; Paul 1986 or more recently Gill 2008) . The Marxist term "bourgeoisie" was developed in the context of transition from feudalism to future proletarian society. For Marx and Engels (1848) , the term was synonymous with modern capitalists, the "owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour", and they highlighted the profound changes that this bourgeois class had set in motion. The "new petty bourgeoisie", later analysed along Marxist lines by political sociologist Nicos Poulantzas (1979: 323-333) , extended to large groups of salaried personnel such as clerical workers, managers and other "non-productive workers".
The concept of the bourgeoisie has tended to be shrouded by a post-socialist narrative that is built around the "breathtakingly vague" term "middle class" (Ost 2015: 614) . Only few researchers, like Judit Bodnár (2009) -a sociologist and anthropologist known for her analysis of the housing culture of post-socialist elites in Budapest -have written explicitly about the "bourgeoisie". In contrast, the majority of scholars focusing on the former Soviet bloc apply the emic category "middle class" (see, for example, Balzer 1998 or more recently Patico 2015) . In the Romanian context, anti-communism in the academy led to the suppression of class analyses, a situation that was only overcome in the late 2000s (Ban 2015: 643-644) . In this regard, sociologists Liviu Chelcea and Oana Druta (2016) have coined the term "zombie socialism" to describe the hegemonic reading that persisted for more than 25 years regarding the former socialist system. This reading was characterised by attacks on the straw man of the socialist state, the denigration of the working class and the glorifi cation of the "middle classes". A similar discourse favouring the "middle classes" can also be found in Czech sociology (Drahokoupil 2015: 580-581 ).
The post-socialist new bourgeoisie must also be understood in relation to earlier socialist elites. According to Milovan Djilas (1957) , a dissenter from Titoism, under state socialism, elites belonged to a "new class" that was not economically based but defi ned by its relationship to the state. In line with this "new class" theory, sociologist Gil Eyal (2000: 51) has identifi ed a post-socialist alliance between dissident intellectuals and "internally exiled" technocrats. This alliance, he says, was the bearer of the "spirit of capitalism" in the Czech Republic. The Prague money changers described at the start of this article and often mythologised in popular discourse were, of course, only a tiny segment of the social strata that was to become the new bourgeoisie. Importantly, most of the postSoviet economic elite were individuals who had capitalised on their connections to the former authorities (the nomenklatura, номенклатурa) (Gill 2008: 66-70) . 5 Conversely, the profound political, economic and social changes were welcomed by those members of the nomenklatura who wished to exchange their predominantly symbolic capital for economic capital (Možný 1991) .
While some of the socialist elite may have been easily absorbed into the new bourgeoisie, the latter's relationship with the socialist "new class" remains ambiguous. Unlike the new class, the post-socialist new bourgeoisie emerged as a class that was entirely economically defi ned with its own material interests. In the Russian context, Jennifer Patico (2015: 23-26) identifi ed a confl ict between the old Soviet "middle classes" (the intelligentsia, интеллигенция) and the post-socialist "new Russians" (новые русские) that took place around the discourse of culturedness (культурностъ).
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On the other hand, Elizabeth Dunn's (2009: 132) study of the managers of the Polish-American enterprise Alima-Gerber notes that post-socialist elites, in turn, expressed their superiority to "simple people" (proste ludzi), who were "unintelligent and incapable". Evidently the informal economy of gifts and favours that emerged in the wake of the "economics of shortage" (Kornai 1980 ) included participants from all classes (Dunn 2009: 141) .
Shifts occurring during the dismantling of state socialist regimes -which, if not directly caused by members of the post-socialist new bourgeoisie, surely benefi ted them -corresponded with new models of capital acquisition in core capitalist countries. In his Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey (2005) shows how a conviction about the regulatory function of markets went from being a marginal economic theory to a practical programme across fi ve continents. 7 The dominant narrative of the post-socialist transition 5 It is also signifi cant that many of the successful entrepreneurs of post-socialist societies did not launch their businesses after the changes to the political and economic system. Rather, these changes tended to catalyse successful projects begun during the late state socialist period (Jouko and Tchalakov 2013).
6 According to Patico (2015) , these two groups did not begin to merge in Russia until the 2000s when a single category took shape around discourses centred on the "self".
7 Since the post-2008 economic crisis, the term "neoliberalism" has been overused and applied unrefl ectively in activist discussions. In this respect, it has often served as a moral putdown among critics with a preference for Keynesianism and Fordism (see, for example, Saad-Filho 2009). In the post-socialist context, on the other hand, the term had specifi c implications; Tobias Rupprecht (2016) , for example, studied the changing image of Chilean neoliberalist policies in early 1990-Russia where Chilean military dictator Augusto Pinochet was transformed from a Soviet bogeyman to a post-Soviet role model. The problems with the view that there were "winners" of the post-socialist transition are compounded by doubts often drew on the paradigm of the "end of history". During this decade, the view that liberal democracy had ultimately triumphed was widely accepted across post-socialist Europe and accompanied by moves to adapt to capitalism as the only imaginable economic model (Buden 2009 , Ther 2014 . At the same time, the post-socialist transition established new categories of "winners" and "losers" (see, for example, Titma, Tuma and Silver 1998). Sociologist Elena Danilova (2014) has argued that this narrative played a crucial part in legitimising the profound social inequalities that either emerged or were reproduced. While discourses valorising wealth were not specifi c to the post-socialist context, they gained importance in this context of rapid economic and social change.
BROTHERS, NOT COMRADES?
According to the hegemonic narrative of post-socialism, the redistribution of wealth favoured those who were most capable (Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 2003) . In the popular version of this story, these were the individuals who could easily, and often also unscrupulously, adapt to the harsh conditions of the new market. While organised crime groups like Prague's money changers made up a mere fraction of the post-socialist new bourgeoisie, it is little wonder that they were more visible in music videos than the nomenklatura and its associates. The prominent role of the mafi a and violent crime gangs in the initial accumulation of capital after socialism is probably best represented in Russian popular culture of the 1990s (Borenstein 2008; Pusca 2015) . The music video for the song "Brothers, Don't Shoot Each Other" (Братва, не стреляйте друг друга) by Evgeny Kemerovsky (Евгений Кемеровский) is a striking illustration of the links between criminal violence and popular music. The title of the song addresses "brothers", an internationally understood reference to crime gang members, as found in gangsta rap and elsewhere. The song's lyrics also describe these individuals as "Russian strong guys" (русские сильные парни) and Kemerovsky pleads with them to stop the violence. 8 about the concept of transition itself (for a critique of "transitology", see Hann 2002) . Even the concept of post-socialism has been controversial since its earliest scholarly use. For extended refl ections on these topics, see Verdery (1996) . 8 The music video tells a story that begins with an overhead shot of a city commuter railway on a bright sunny day in the neighbourhood near the (West) Berlin S-Bahn station Savignyplatz (the name is partly visible). A group of four sharp-looking men in expensive suits, some of them with black sunglasses, walks down the street. In the forefront is the boss played by Kemerovsky, who is wearing a white jacket and talking on his mobile phone. Two "strong guys" (сильные парни) guard him from either side and one from the back. The four stop at a café and sit down at a table inside. Soft piano can be heard along with the voice of the waiter whom the bodyguards are eyeing carefully. The waiter directs Kemerovsky's attention to a television on the bar. A voice can be heard on a programme called "World News". The screen shows a dead body in a white shirt covered in blood. The address "Petrovka 38, Moskow [sic]" appears, referring to the headquarters of the criminal police.
Kemerovsky looks stunned and as he rushes from the café, he covers his face with his hands. Only then does the music of the song begin to play. The rest of "Brothers, Don't Shoot Each Other" interweaves scenes from Russia and Berlin. The location of the funeral is identifi able from the snow and the Russian Orthodox cathedral. Shots of the Berlin Palace, Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church and the bridges over the Kemerovsky´s song belongs in the tradition of Russian chansons (sometimes translated as "outlaw songs", блатная песня, блатной фольклор, блатняк), a genre that does not necessarily involve criminal behaviour or themes. It can perhaps be best described as an "alegal street song" (Rothstein 2001: 791-794, my emphasis) , that is to say, a song that occurs outside and beyond the logic of the law.
The music video for "Brothers, Don't Shoot Each Other" has been praised as a major breakthrough for its depiction of the mafi a and the associated violence on Russian screens (Мажаев, 2014 ). Kemerovsky's song also featured in the TV crime miniseries "Brigada" (Бригада, 2002, directed by Aleksei Sidorov), which cemented the links between this song, its artist, the music video and the criminal underworld. The video is rich in meanings and values. Perhaps most powerful is its account of personal loss that will relate to general audiences. More specifi c to the post-socialist context, the clip shows the direct links between the business world and violence. The eagle -the bird of prey that oversees the drama -appears to symbolise an individualistic and aggressive notion of liberty. At the same time, the clip suggests a fascination with the aristocracy, one of the key cultural preoccupations of the Marxist "bourgeoisie" (Wallerstein 1991) . Here the "strong guys" in the video resemble the heroes of Russian historical novels about blood feuds among the aristocracy. This plot, thus, speaks to the overall quest of the new bourgeoisie to assert their culturedness vis-à-vis the intelligentsia.
Such strategy of asserting culturedness seems to be unique to the Russian chanson. Similar examples cannot be found in Czech "money changers' pop", Polish pop folk music known as disco polo (sometimes translated as "backyard music", discussed briefl y below) or the Romanian manele genre whose songs often also have close mafi a connections (Schiop 2016) . In this regard, the manele is a popular folk music style that exemplifi es the post-socialist context, with infl uences including Turkish and Middle Eastern pop music artists and global cultural icons such as gangsta rappers (de la Bretèque and Stoichiţă 2012). Signifi cantly, Romania's cultural elite has condemned the genre as a symptom of the impoverishment of culture -a critique which, it has been pointed out, has a strong anti-Roma subtext (Haliliuc 2015) .
Spree River appear. An eagle watches over -and may even be "supervising"-the coffi n that is held aloft by six members of the "brotherhood" (братва), who are all dressed in black and wearing dark sunglasses with their hair slicked back. Back in Berlin, Kemerovsky sings as he walks through a crowd. At one point, the video montage speeds up and his voice lifts as he starts to run from Kurfürstendamm to Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church.
As a saxophone solo plays, our attention shifts to a swanky restaurant in Russia where a feast between two gangsters and their female companions is interrupted by a phone call. These fi gures are next seen in a car and riding through the night to a shoot-out at a bridge. A car explosion follows. (The scenes we are watching seem to be the memories of one of the women.) In Berlin, Kemerovsky is still out running, and we see him next at a train station (Berlin Zoological Garden) beside a modern intercity train. The police are investigating the scene at the bridge and a photographer approaches the dead body. We realise that this is the same corpse that appeared on TV earlier. The music fades as Kemerovsky walks along the empty train platform. We catch one last glimpse of the eagle fl ying against the red sky at sunset.
Directed by Nicolae Guță, one of the earliest and best known manele interpreters, the 1997 music video "How Big is the World" (Cat este lumea de mare) is typical of the fairly low-budget music videos produced during the major economic downturn in Romania between the second half of the 1980s and the early 2000s. Many of the early manele videos of these years were the work of Zoom Studio, a production company that doubled as a photo model agency. "How Big is the World" depicts a family celebration that might be a small boy's birthday or a confi rmation ceremony. The video focuses on a tough-looking businessman who may be a mafi oso and is probably the father of the small boy. From behind him, a mostly Roma band plays, with Nicolae Guță singing.
To audiences today, the protagonist of "How Big is the World" may seem almost like a caricature of the new bourgeois as he sits at a table with drinks and waves around a large quantity of cash that he off ers to the band. However, as François Ruegg (2013) observed of the ostentatious palatial homes built by some Romanian Roma, the aesthetics of bling can also serve to affi rm the social status of a "new and rich cosmopolitan élite". Though performed by mainly Roma musicians, manele has also proven popular with many nonRoma Romanians, a fact that may speak to its status as a spectacle of the "Other" (Hall 1997: 225-239) . The signifi cance of manele music videos may also have ties with the global pop culture. It is worth recalling that the hip-hop moguls who have dominated the music video format emerged simultaneously with the post-socialist new bourgeoisie (Smith 2003) .
LOOKING WEST?
The fall of state socialist regimes of the Soviet bloc represented the fi rst opportunity for many East Europeans to compare their fantasies with the reality of "zagrantitsa", the Russian word for foreign countries (заграница, literally "behind the border"). In his account of the cultural practices of the "last Soviet generation", Alexei Yurchak (2006: 159) introduces the category of the "imaginary West", a realm that was "produced locally and existed only at [a] time when the real West could not be encountered". The "imaginary West" may well be on display in Sagvan Tofi 's "Give and Take", whose well-crafted shots of city lights serve, in the imagination at least, to connect the turf of Prague's illegal street money changers with a western megalopolis.
Immediately after the 1989/1990 changeover, several other music videos also attempted to depict encounters with zagrantitsa. One of these was Russian singer Masha Rasputina's (Маша Распутина) "In a White Mercedes" (На Белом Мерседесе) (1991), a low-budget, up-tempo video about a trip to Barcelona where she sings and dances through the city streets. Clearly, Barcelona was a more amenable location for depicting 9 Barcelona appears to have been a substitute for Odessa since the song's lyrics make many references to a port on the Black Sea. We might contrast this rather arbitrary-seeming setting with the placement of the abundance-based economics that was an antidote to the shortage-based economics of many late socialist Soviet bloc countries: during her trip, Rasputina visits a fruit and vegetable market where she is so intoxicated by all the goods on display that she lifts some oranges to her face to savour their smell. Other parts of the clip take place on a cruise ship, a mode of travel that became something of a status symbol for many who might come under the umbrella of the post-socialist new bourgeoisie.
A similar new bourgeois fantasy plays out in the 1994 music video "Chocolate Girl" (Kakaová) starring singer Karel Gott, who has been billed as the "ultimate star of Czechoslovak pop music" (Bílek 2016) . Gott himself has an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the state socialist past; as Bílek (2016) notes, no singer could have represented state socialism in Czechoslovakia better. But his popularity did not at all end with the changes of 1989/1990. True to the song lyrics, the video for "Chocolate Girl" shows the singer drinking a Malibu cocktail under a palm tree on the banks of Prague's Vltava River. As he sits there, he daydreams about fl ying away to an exotic tropical beach where he might enjoy the good life and fl irt with a beautiful local girl. The music is partly infl uenced by calypso and the lyrics refer to the Bahamas, which along with Hawaii, assumed the place in the cultural imagination during the 1990s that had once been occupied by the "Golden Sands" (Златни пясъци) in north-eastern Bulgaria -a resort frequented by many Czechoslovak tourists in the 1980s. "Chocolate Girl" was a love song reportedly written for a real woman whom the singer briefl y dated (Šíp 2007) . The music video, however, raises questions about the privileged position of its wealthy white male protagonist in line with broader critiques laid out by postcolonial theory.
In contrast to the joyous encounter with the West in "In a White Mercedes" and the lust for the South expressed in "Chocolate Girl", other post-socialist music videos have off ered a more ambivalent take on zagrantitsa. In this regard, "This is Not the USA" (To Nie USA), a 1993 clip by the Polish pop folk (disco polo) outfi t Boys is a direct retort to Yurchak's ideas about fascination with an imaginary West. Instead, this upbeat melodic song uses steady rhythms and synthesised sounds to send the message that the home country is far better than any imagined Ameryka.
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"This is not the USA" conveys the ambiguous worldliness and material consumption-based ecstasy that are typical of disco polo (Rawska 2016) . At the same time, it raises more pressing questions that are especially relevant to the current much of Kemerovsky's "Brothers, Don't Shoot Each Other" in Berlin, a foreign city known as an operating base for Russian criminal gangs and one that heightens the sense of loss and isolation in the context of a personal tragedy unfolding elsewhere.
10 This position is reinforced by several scenes in the video in which band members sing from the top of statues at Warsaw's Palace of Culture and Science. In relation to the choice of this monument, visual studies scholar Monika Borys (2015: 15) notes that it is "not only a symbol of metropolitan character but more than that, [it] is a reference point for the provincials, harnessed into this new game of aspirations and ambitions". Near the end of the video, there is a montage of scenes from the streets of New York and the streets of Warsaw, inviting us to contrast and compare the two cities. The Palace of Culture and Science seems to be depoliticised and freed of its original purpose as a Stalinist temple for workers and peasants. Instead, in a spirit of détournement, it is re-colonised "from below" and becomes a symbol of the patriotic movement of rural and uneducated Poles who have arrived in the city. crisis within post-socialist liberal democracies. Like manele, disco polo has been criticised by members of the "intelligentsia" for its apparent tastelessness. Such comments stand in for substantive critiques of the segment of the new bourgeoisie that has endangered the previously privileged positions of the cultural elite. For these commenters, groups like Boys represent an internal Other, who has come "from the villages around Ełk" (Borys 2015: 15) to become a "peasant in the city" and eventually also a "new bourgeois".
CONCLUSIONS
Several values attributable to the post-socialist "new bourgeoisie" can be discerned from the music videos in the current study. In particular, these videos point to an ambitious and hedonistic class of go-getters who are ready to take their place in the sun. They also suggest this class's reliance on both cosmopolitan and patriotic narratives, sometimes operating, as is the case in Kemerovsky's "Brothers, Don't Shoot Each Other", within the same clip. The quest of the new bourgeoisie to assert its culturedness vis-à-vis the "intelligentsia" may have involved embracing practices viewed as aristocratic. More often, however, it meant creating a new hegemony based on hybrid or mimicked cultural practices discussed above.
Along with consumption, the post-socialist new bourgeoisie valorised travel. This taste for exotic images of tropical paradises is perhaps affi rmed by real-life cases of "tax exile" among leading post-socialist fi gures with ties to politics and organised crime. Some themes raised in this study call for more research; the ambivalence in Polish disco polo about the West may, for instance, refl ect the fact that in the fi nal years of the Polish People's Republic, the country's borders were more open than those of its neighbours. Even so, we can make some general statements about the long-term outcomes of the initial decade of colourful hedonism after socialism. Popular resistance to the liberal and cosmopolitan new bourgeoisie in many former Soviet bloc countries has led to a conservative and nationalistic mobilisation.
